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Abstract
We propose a new measure of deviations from expected utility, given data on
economic choices under risk and uncertainty. In a revealed preference setup,
and given a positive number e, we provide a characterization of the datasets
whose deviation (in beliefs, utility, or perceived prices) is within e of expected
utility theory. The number e can then be used as a distance to the theory.
We apply our methodology to three recent large-scale experiments. Many
subjects in those experiments are consistent with utility maximization, but
not expected utility maximization. The correlation of our measure with de-
mographics is also interesting, and provides new and intuitive findings on
expected utility.
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1 Introduction
Revealed preference theory started out as an investigation into the empirical content of
utility maximization, but more recently has turned to the empirical content of specific
utility theories. The leading example is expected utility: recent theoretical work seeks to
characterize the choice behaviors that are consistent with expected utility maximization.
At the same time, a number of empirical papers carry out revealed preference tests
on data of choices under risk and uncertainty. We seek to bridge the gap between the
theoretical understanding of expected utility theory, and the machinery needed to analyze
experimental data on choices under risk and uncertainty.1
Imagine an agent making economic decisions, choosing contingent consumption given
market prices and income. A long tradition in revealed preference theory studies the
consistency of such choices with utility maximization, and a more recent literature has
investigated consistency with expected utility theory (EU). 2 Consistency, however, is a
black or white question. The choices are either consistent with EU or they are not. Our
contribution is to describe the degree to which choices are consistent with EU.
Revealed preference theory has developed measures of how far choices are from being
compatible with general utility maximization. The most widely used measure is the
Critical Cost Efficiency Index (CCEI) proposed by Afriat (1972). Varian (1990) proposes
a modification, and Echenique et al. (2011) propose an alternative measure. 3 Such
measures are designed to gauge the distance between choices that cannot be rationalized
by any utility function, and choices for which there exists some utility function that could
explain them. They are not designed to measure consistency with EU.
The CCEI has been widely used to analyze experimental data, including data that
involves choice under risk and uncertainty. See, for example, Ahn et al. (2014), Choi et al.
(2007), Choi et al. (2014), Carvalho et al. (2016), and Carvalho and Silverman (2017).
These studies involve agents making decisions under risk or uncertainty, but the authors
have not had tools to investigate consistency with EU, the most commonly used theory
1We analyze objective expected utility theory for choice under risk and subjective expected utility
theory for choice under uncertainty.
2 The seminal papers include Samuelson (1938), Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982) (see Chambers and
Echenique (2016) for an exposition). The work on EU includes Green and Srivastava (1986), Kubler
et al. (2014), and Echenique and Saito (2015).
3Dziewulski (2018) provides a foundation for CCEI based on the model in Dziewulski (2016), which
seeks to rationalize violations of utility-maximizing behavior with a model of just-noticeable differences.
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to explain choices under risk or uncertainty. The purpose of our paper is to provide such
a tool.
Of course, there is nothing wrong with studying general utility maximization in envi-
ronments with risk and uncertainty, but it is surely also of interest to use the same data
to look at EU. After a theoretical discussion of our measure (Sections 3 and 5), we carry
out an empirical implementation of our proposals to data from the last three of the cited
papers (Section 4). 4
Our empirical application has two purposes. The first is to illustrate how our method
can be applied. The second is to a give a new use to existing data. We use data
from three large-scale experiments (Choi et al., 2014; Carvalho et al., 2016; Carvalho
and Silverman, 2017), each with over 1,000 subjects, that involves choices under risk.
Given our methodology, the data can be used to test expected utility theory, not only
general utility maximization. The main take aways from our empirical application are
as follows. a) The data confirm that CCEI is not a good indication of compliance with
EU. Among agents with high CCEI, who seem to be close to consistent with utility
maximization, our measure of closeness to EU is very dispersed. b) Correlation between
closeness to EU and demographic characteristics yields interesting results. We find that
younger subjects, those who have high cognitive abilities, and those who are working,
are closer to EU behavior than older, low ability, or passive, subjects. For some of the
three experiments, we also find that highly educated, high-income subjects, and males,
are closer to EU.
In the rest of the introduction, we lay out the argument for why CCEI is inadequate
to measure deviations from EU.
The CCEI is meant to test deviations from general utility maximization. If an agent’s
behavior is not consistent with utility maximization, then it cannot possibly be consistent
with expected utility maximization. It stands to reason that if an agent’s behavior is far
from being rationalizable with a general utility function, as measured by CCEI, then it
is also far from being rationalizable with an expected utility function. The problem is, of
course, that an agent may be rationalizable with a general utility function but not with
an expected utility function.
Broadly speaking, the CCEI proceeds by “amending” inconsistent choices through
4These papers involve choices under risk, with given probabilities, and therefore represent a natural
unit of analysis.
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the devise of changing income. This works for general utility maximization, but it is
the wrong way to amend choices that are inconsistent with EU: EU is about getting
the marginal rates of substitution right, so prices need to be changed, not incomes.
The problem is illustrated with a simple example in Figure 1. Suppose that there are
two states of the world, labeled 1 and 2. An agent purchases a state-contingent asset
x = (x1, x2), given Arrow-Debreu prices p = (p1, p2) and her income. Prices and incomes
define a budget set. In panel A of Figure 1 we are given two choices for the agent, xa
and xb, for two different budgets. The choices in panel A of Figure 1 are inconsistent
with utility maximization: they violate the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP).
When xb (xa) was chosen, xa (xb, respectively) was strictly inside of the budget set. This
violation of WARP can be resolved by shifting down the budget line associated with
choice xb below the dotted green line passing through xa. Alternatively, the violation
can be resolved by shifting down the budget line associated with choice xa below the
dotted blue line passing through xb. Afriat’s CCEI is the smallest of the two shifts that
are needed: the smallest proportion of shifting down a budget line to resolve WARP
violation. Therefore, the CCEI of this dataset corresponds to the dotted green line
passing through xa. That is, the CCEI is (pb · xa)/(pb · xb).
Now consider the example in panel B of Figure 1. There are again two choices made
by a subject, xa and xb, for two different budgets. These choices do not violate WARP,
and CCEI indicates perfect compliance with the theory of utility maximization. The
choices in the panel are not, however, compatible with EU. To see why, assume that
the dataset were rationalized by an expected utility: µ1u(x
k
1) + µ2u(x
k
2), where (µ1, µ2)
are the probabilities of the two states, and u is a (smooth) concave utility function over
money. Note that the slope of a tangent line to the indifference curve at a point xk is
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equal to the marginal rate of substitution (MRS): µ1u
′(xk1)/µ2u
′(xk2). Moreover, at the
45-degree line (i.e., when xk1 = x
k
2), the slope must be equal to µ1
u′(xk1)/µ2
u′(xk2) = µ1/µ2.
This is a contradiction because in Figure 1 panel B, the two tangent lines (green dotted
lines) associated with xa and xb cross each other. In contrast with panel B, the figure in
panel C shows choices that are consistent with EU. Tangent lines at the 45-degree line
are parallel in this case.
Importantly, the violation in panel B cannot be resolved by shifting budget lines
up or down, or more generally by adjusting agents’ expenditures. The reason is that the
empirical content of expected utility is captured by the relation between prices and marginal
rates of substitution. The slope, not the level, of the budget line is what matters.
Our contribution is to propose a measure of how close a dataset is to being consistent
with expected utility maximization. Our measure is based on the idea that marginal
rates of substitution have to conform to expected utility maximization. If one “perturbs”
marginal utility enough, then a dataset is always consistent with expected utility. Our
measure is simply a measure of how large of a perturbation is needed to rationalize
a dataset. Perturbations of marginal utility can be interpreted in three different, but
equivalent, ways: as measurement error on prices, as random shocks to marginal utility
in the spirit of random utility theory, or as perturbations to agents’ beliefs. For example,
if the data in panel B of Figure 1 is e away from being consistent with expected utility,
then one can find beliefs µa and µb, one for each observation, so that expected utility
is maximized for these observation-specific beliefs, and such that the data is consistent
with such perturbed beliefs.
Our measure can be applied in settings where probabilities are known and objective,
for which we develop a theory in Section 3, and an application to experimental data
in Section 4. It can also be applied to settings where probabilities are not known, and
therefore subjective (see Section 5).
Finally, we propose a statistical methodology for testing the null hypothesis of con-
sistency with EU. Our test relies on a set of auxiliary assumptions: the methodology
is developed in Section 4.3. The test indicates moderate levels of rejection of the EU
hypothesis.
5
2 Model
Let S be a finite set of states. We occasionally use S to denote the number |S| of states.
Let ∆++(S) = {µ ∈ RS++ |
∑S
s=1 µs = 1} denote the set of strictly positive probability
measures on S. In our model, the objects of choice are state-contingent monetary payoffs,
or monetary acts. A monetary act is a vector in RS+.
Definition 1. A dataset is a finite collection of pairs (x, p) ∈ RS+ ×RS++.
The interpretation of a dataset (xk, pk)Kk=1 is that it describes K purchases of a state-
contingent payoff xk at some given vector of prices pk, and income pk · xk.
For any prices p ∈ RS++ and positive number I > 0, the set
B(p, I) = {y ∈ RS+ | p · y ≤ I}
is the budget set defined by p and I.
Expected utility theory requires a decision maker to solve the problem
max
x∈B(p,I)
∑
s∈S
µsu(xs) (1)
when faced with prices p ∈ RS++ and income I > 0, where µ ∈ ∆++(S) is a belief and u
is a concave utility function over money. We are interested in concave u; an assumption
that corresponds to risk aversion.
The belief µ will have two interpretations in our model. First, in Section 3, we
shall focus on decisions taken under risk. The belief µ will be a known “objective”
probability measure µ∗ ∈ ∆++(S). Then, in Section 5, we study choice under uncertainty.
Consequently, The belief µ will be a subjective beliefs, which is unobservable to us as
outside observers.
When imposed on a dataset, expected utility maximization (1) may be too demanding.
We are interested in situations where the model in (1) holds approximately. As a result,
we shall relax (1) by “perturbing” some elements of the model. The exercise will be to
see if a dataset is consistent with the model in which some elements have been perturbed.
Specifically, we shall perturb beliefs, utilities or prices.
First, consider a perturbation of utility u. We allow u to depend on the choice problem
k and the realization of the state s. We suppose that the utility of consumption xs in
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state s is given by εksu(xs), with ε
k
s being a (multiplicative) perturbation in utility. To
sum up, given price p and income I, a decision maker solves the problem
max
x∈B(p,I)
∑
s∈S
µsε
k
su(xs) (2)
when faced with prices p ∈ RS++ and income I > 0. Here {εks} is a set of perturbations,
and u is, as before, a concave utility function over money.
In the second place, consider a perturbation of beliefs. We allow µ to be different for
each choice problem k. That is, given price p and income I, a decision maker solves the
problem
max
x∈B(p,I)
∑
s∈S
µksu(xs) (3)
when faced with prices p ∈ RS++ and income I > 0, where {µk} ⊂ ∆++(S) is a set of
beliefs and u is a concave utility function over money.
Finally, consider a perturbation of prices. Our consumer faces perturbed prices p˜ks =
εksp
k
s , with a perturbation ε
k
s that depends on the choice problem k and the state s. Given
price p and income I, a decision maker solves the problem
max
x∈B(p˜,I)
∑
s∈S
µsu(xs), (4)
when faced with income I > 0 and the perturbed prices p˜ks = ε
k
sp
k
s for each k ∈ K and
s ∈ S.
Observe that our three sources of perturbations have different interpretations. Per-
turbed prices can be thought of a prices subject to measurement error. Perturbed utility
is an instance of random utility models. Finally, perturbations of beliefs can be thought
of as a kind of random utility, or as an inability to exactly use probabilities.
3 Perturbed Objective Expected Utility
In this section we treat the problem under risk: there exists a known “objective” belief
µ∗ ∈ ∆++(S) that determines the realization of states.
As mentioned above, we go through each of the sources of perturbation: beliefs,
utility and prices. We seek to understand how large a perturbation has to be in order to
rationalize a dataset. It turns out that, for this purpose, all sources of perturbations are
equivalent.
7
3.1 Belief Perturbation
We allow the decision maker to have a belief µk for each choice k. We seek to understand
how much the belief µk deviates from the objective belief µ∗ by evaluating how far the
ratio,
µks/µ
k
t
µ∗s/µ
∗
t
,
where s 6= t, differs from 1. If the ratio is larger (smaller) than one, then it means that
in choice k, the decision maker believes the relative likelihood of state s with respect to
state t is larger (smaller, respectively) than what he should believe, given the objective
belief µ∗.
Given a nonnegative number e, we say that a dataset is e-belief-perturbed objective
expected utility (OEU) rational, if it can be rationalized using expected utility with
perturbed beliefs for which the relative likelihood ratios do not differ by more than e
from their objective equivalents. Formally:
Definition 2. Let e ∈ R+. A dataset (xk, pk)Kk=1 is e-belief-perturbed OEU rational if
there exist µk ∈ ∆++ for each k ∈ K, and a concave and strictly increasing function
u : R+ → R, such that, for all k,
y ∈ B(pk, pk · xk) =⇒
∑
s∈S
µksu(ys) ≤
∑
s∈S
µksu(x
k
s). (5)
and for each k ∈ K and s, t ∈ S,
1
1 + e
≤ µ
k
s/µ
k
t
µ∗s/µ
∗
t
≤ 1 + e. (6)
When e = 0, e-belief-perturbed OEU rationality requires that µks = µ
∗
s, so the case of
exact consistency with expected utility is obtained with a zero bound of belief perturba-
tions. Moreover, it is easy to see that by taking e to be large enough, any data set can
be e-belief-perturbed rationalized.
We should note that e bounds belief perturbations for all states and observations. As
such, it is sensitive to extreme observations and outliers (the CCEI is also subject to this
critique: see Echenique et al. (2011)). In our empirical results, we carry our a robustness
analysis to account for such sensitivity: see Appendix D.2.
Finally, we mention a potential relationship with models of nonexpected utility. One
could think of rank-dependent utility, for example, as a way of allowing agent’s beliefs to
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adapt to his observed choices. However, unlike e-belief-perturbed OEU, the nonexpected
utility theory requires some consistencies on the dependency. For example, for the case
of rank dependent utility, the agent’s belief over the sates is affected by the ranking of
the outcomes across states.
3.2 Price Perturbation
We now turn to perturbed prices: think of them as prices measured with error. The
perturbation is a multiplicative noise term εks to the Arrow-Debreu state price p
k
s . Thus,
perturbed state price are εksp
k
s . Note that if ε
k
s = ε
k
t for all s, t, then introducing the noise
does not affect anything because it only changes the scale of prices. In other words, what
matters is how perturbations affect relative prices, that is εks/ε
k
t .
We can measure how much the noise εk perturbs relative prices by evaluating how
much the ratio,
εks
εkt
,
where s 6= t, differs from 1.
Definition 3. Let e ∈ R+. A dataset (xk, pk)Kk=1 is e-price-perturbed OEU rational if
there exists a concave and strictly increasing function u : R+ → R, and εk ∈ RS+ for
each k ∈ K such that, for all k,
y ∈ B(p˜k, p˜k · xk) =⇒
∑
s∈S
µ∗su(ys) ≤
∑
s∈S
µ∗su(x
k
s), (7)
where for each k ∈ K and s ∈ S
p˜ks = p
k
sε
k
s
5 (8)
and for each k ∈ K and s, t ∈ S
1
1 + e
≤ ε
k
s
εkt
≤ 1 + e. (9)
The idea is illustrated in Figure 2 (panels A-D). The figure shows how the perturba-
tions to relative prices affect budget lines, under the assumption that |S| = 2. For each
value of e ∈ {0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1} and k ∈ K, the blue area is the set {x ∈ RS+ | x · p˜k =
xk · p˜k and (9)} of perturbed budget lines. The dataset in the figure is the same as in
panel B of Figure 1, which is not rationalizable with any expected utility function.
5It is without loss of generality to add an additional restriction that p˜k · xk = pk · xk for each k ∈ K
because what matters are the relative prices.
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Figure 2: (A-D) Illustration of perturbed budget sets with e ∈ {0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1}. (E)
Example of price-perturbed expected utility rationalization.
Figure 2, panel E illustrates how we rationalize the dataset in panel B of Figure 1.
The blue bold lines are perturbed budget lines and the green bold curves are (fixed)
indifference curves passing through each of the xk in the data. Note that the indifference
curves have the same slope at the 45-degree line. The blue shaded areas are the sets of
perturbed budget lines bounded by e = 1. Perturbed budget lines needed to rationalize
the choices are indicated with blue bold lines. Since these are inside the shaded areas,
the dataset is price-perturbed OEU rational with e = 1.
3.3 Utility Perturbation
Finally, we turn to perturbed utility. As explained above, perturbations are multiplicative
and take the form εksu(x
k
s). It is easy to see that this method is equivalent to belief
perturbation. As for price perturbations, we seek to measure how much the εk perturbs
utilities at choice problem k by evaluating how much the ratio,
εks
εkt
,
where s 6= t, differs from 1.
Definition 4. Let e ∈ R+. A dataset (xk, pk)Kk=1 is e-utility-perturbed OEU rational if
there exists a concave and strictly increasing function u : R+ → R and εk ∈ RS+ for each
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k ∈ K such that, for all k,
y ∈ B(pk, pk · xk) =⇒
∑
s∈S
µ∗sε
k
su(ys) ≤
∑
s∈S
µ∗sε
k
su(x
k
s), (10)
and for each k ∈ K and s, t ∈ S
1
1 + e
≤ ε
k
s
εkt
≤ 1 + e. (11)
3.4 Equivalence of the Three Measures
The first observation we make is that the three sources of perturbations are equivalent,
in the sense that for any e a data set is e-perturbed rationalizable according to one of
the sources if and only if it is also rationalizable according to any of the other sources.
By virtue of this result, we can interpret our measure deviations from OEU in any of the
ways we have introduced.
Theorem 1. Let e ∈ R+, and D be a dataset. The following are equivalent:
• D is e-belief-perturbed OEU rational;
• D is e-price-perturbed OEU rational;
• D is e-utility-perturbed OEU rational.
In light of Theorem 1 we shall simply say that a data set is e-perturbed OEU rational
if it is e-belief-perturbed OEU rational, and this will be equivalent to being e-price-
perturbed OEU rational, and e-utility-perturbed OEU rational.
3.5 Characterizations
We proceed to give a characterization of the dataset that are e-perturbed OEU rational.
Specifically, given e ∈ R+, we propose a revealed preference axiom and prove that a
dataset satisfies the axiom if and only if it is e-perturbed OEU rational.
Before we state the axiom, we need to introduce some additional notation. In the
current model, where µ∗ is known and objective, what matters to an expected utility
maximizer is not the state price itself, but instead the risk-neutral price:
11
Definition 5. For any dataset (pk, xk)Kk=1, the risk neutral price ρ
k
s ∈ RS++ in choice
problem k at state s is defined by
ρks =
pks
µ∗s
.
As in Echenique and Saito (2015), the axiom we propose involves a sequence (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1
of pairs satisfying certain conditions.
Definition 6. A sequence of pairs (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 ≡ σ is called a test sequence if
(1) xkisi > x
k′i
s′i
for all i;
(2) each k appears as ki (on the left of the pair) the same number of times it appears
as k′i (on the right).
Echenique and Saito (2015) provide an axiom, termed the Strong Axiom for Revealed
Objective Expected Utility (SAROEU), which states for any test sequence (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1,
we have
n∏
i=1
ρkisi
ρ
k′i
s′i
≤ 1. (12)
SAROEU is equivalent to the axiom provided by Kubler et al. (2014).
It is easy to see why SAROEU is necessary. Assuming (for simplicity of exposition)
that u is differentiable, the first order condition of the maximization problem (1) for
choice problem k
λkpks = µ
∗
su
′(xks), or equivalently, ρ
k
s =
u′(xks)
λk
,
where λk > 0 is a Lagrange multiplier.
By substituting this equation on the left hand side of (12), we have
n∏
i=1
ρkisi
ρ
k′i
s′i
=
n∏
i=1
λk
′
i
λki
·
n∏
i=1
u′(xkisi )
u′(xk
′
i
s′i
)
≤ 1.
To see that this term is smaller than 1, note that the first term of the product of the
λ-ratios is equal to one because of the condition (2) of the test sequence: all λk must
cancel out. The second term of the product of u′-ratio is less than one because of the
concavity of u, and the condition (1) of the test sequence (i.e., u′(xkisi )/u
′(xk
′
i
s′i
) ≤ 1). Thus
SAROEU is implied. It is more complicated to show that SAROEU is sufficient (see
Echenique and Saito (2015) for details).
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Now, e-perturbed OEU rationality allows the decision maker to use different beliefs
µk ∈ ∆++(S) for each choice problem k. Consequently, SAROEU is not necessary for
e-perturbed OEU rationality. To see that SAROEU can be violated, note that the first
order condition of the maximization (3) for choice k is as follows: there exists a positive
number (Lagrange multiplier) λk such that for each s ∈ S,
λkpks = µ
k
su
′(xks), or equivalently, ρ
k
s =
µks
µ∗s
u′(xks)
λk
.
Suppose that xks > x
k
t . Then (x
k
s , x
k
t ) is a test sequence (of length one). We have
ρks
ρkt
=
(
µks
µ∗s
u′(xks)
λk
)/(
µkt
µ∗t
u′(xkt )
λk
)
=
u′(xks)
u′(xkt )
µks/µ
k
t
µ∗s/µ
∗
t
.
Even though xks > x
k
t implies the first term of the ratio of u
′ is less than one, the second
term can be strictly larger than one. When xks is close enough to x
k
t , the first term is
almost one; the second term is strictly larger than one. Consequently, SAROEU can be
violated.
However, by (6), we know that the second term is bounded by 1+e. So we must have
ρks
ρkt
≤ 1 + e.
In general, for a sequence (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 of pairs, one may suspect that the bound is calcu-
lated as (1 + e)n. This is not true because if xks appears as both x
ki
si
for some i and as
x
k′j
s′j
for some j, then all µks can be canceled out. What matters is the number of times x
k
s
appears without being canceled out. The number can be defined as follows.
Definition 7. Consider any sequence (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 of pairs. Let (x
ki
si
, x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 ≡ σ. For
any k ∈ K ands ∈ S,
d(σ, k, s) = #{i | xks = xkisi} −#{i | xks = x
k′i
s′i
}.
and
m(σ) =
∑
s∈S
∑
k∈K:d(σ,k,s)>0
d(σ, k, s).
Note that, if d(σ, k, s) is positive, then d(σ, k, s) is the number of times µks appears as
a numerator without being canceled out. If it is negative, then d(σ, k, s) is the number
of times µks appears as a denominator without being canceled out. So m(σ) is the “net”
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number of terms such as µks/µ
k
t that are present in the numerator. Thus the relevant
bound is (1 + e)m(σ).
Given the discussion above, it is easy to see that the following axiom is necessary for
e-perturbed OEU rationality.
Axiom 1 (e-Perturbed Strong Axiom for Revealed Objective Expected Utility (e-PSAROEU)).
For any test sequence of pairs (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 ≡ σ, we have
n∏
i=1
ρkisi
ρ
k′i
s′i
≤ (1 + e)m(σ).
The main result of this section is to show that the axiom is also sufficient.
Theorem 2. Given e ∈ R+, and D be a dataset. The following are equivalent:
• D is e-belief-perturbed OEU rational.
• D satisfies e-PSAROEU.
Axioms like e-PSAROEU can be interpreted as a statement about downward sloping
demand (see Echenique et al., 2016). For example (xks , x
k
s′) with x
k
s > x
k
s′ is a test
sequence. If risk neutral prices satisfy ρks > ρ
k
s′ , then the data violate downward sloping
demand. Now e-PSAROEU measures the extent of the violation by controlling the size
of ρks/ρ
k
s′ .
In its connection to downward sloping demand, Theorem 2 formalizes the idea of
testing OEU through the correlation of risk-neutral prices and quantities: see Friedman
et al. (2018) and our discussion in Section 4.2. Theorem 2 and the axiom e-PSAROEU
give the precise form that the downward sloping demand property takes in order to
characterize OEU, and provides a non-parametric justification to the practice of analyzing
the correlation of prices and quantities.
As mentioned, 0-PSAROEU is equivalent to SAROEU. When e =∞, the e-PSAROEU
always holds because (1 + e)m(σ) =∞.
Given a dataset, we shall calculate the smallest e for which the dataset satisfies e-
PSAROEU. It is easy to see that such a minimal level of e exists. 6 We explain in
Appendices B and C how it is calculated in practice.
6In Appendix B, we show that e∗ can be obtained as a solution of minimization of a continuous
function on a compact space. So the minimum exists.
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Definition 8. Minimal e, denoted e∗, is the smallest e′ ≥ 0 for which the data satisfies
e′-PSAROEU.
The number e∗ is a crucial component of our empirical analysis. Importantly, it is
the basis of a statistical procedure for testing the null hypothesis of OEU rationality.
As mentioned above, e∗ is a bound that has to hold across all observations, and
therefore may be sensitive to extreme outliers. It is, however, easy to check the sensitivity
of the calculated e∗ to an extreme observation. One can re-calculate e∗ after dropping
one or two observations, and look for large changes (Appendix D.2).
Finally, e∗ depends on the prices and the objective probability which a decision maker
faces. In particular, it is clear from e-PSAROEU that 1 + e is bounded by the maximum
ratio of risk-neutral prices (i.e., maxk,k′∈K,s,s′∈S ρks/ρ
k′
s′ ).
4 Testing (Objective) Expected Utility
We use our methods to test for perturbed OEU on datasets from three experiments im-
plemented through large-scale online surveys. The datasets are taken from Choi et al.
(2014), hereafter CKMS, Carvalho et al. (2016), hereafter CMW, and Carvalho and Sil-
verman (2017), hereafter CS. All of these experiments followed the experimental structure
introduced originally by Choi et al. (2007). 7
It is worth mentioning here that all three papers, CKMS, CMW, and CS, focus on
CCEI as a measure of violation of basic rationality. We shall instead look at the more
narrow model of OEU, and use e∗ as our measure of violations of the model. Our
procedure for calculating e∗ is explained in Appendices B and C.
4.1 Datasets
CKMS experiment Choi et al. (2014) used the CentERpanel, a stratified online
weekly survey of a sample of over 2,000 households and 5,000 individual members in the
7We focused on CKMS, CMW, and CS because they have much larger samples than Choi et al.
(2007), and collect sociodemographic variables. Choi et al. (2007) estimate a two-parameter utility
function based on Gul’s (1991) model of disappointment aversion. We report an analysis of Choi et al.’s
(2007) dataset in Appendix D.
15
025
50
75
100
0 25 50 75 100
Account 1
Ac
co
un
t 2
Figure 3: Sample budget lines. A set of 25 budgets from one real subject in Choi et al.
(2014).
Netherlands. They implemented experimental tasks using the panel’s survey instrument,
randomly recruiting subjects from the entire CentERpanel sample. Their experiment
was conducted with 1,182 CentERpanel adult members.
The instrument allowed them to collect a wide variety of individual demographic and
economic information from the subjects. The main sociodemographic information they
obtained include gender, age, education level, household monthly income, occupation,
and household composition. 8
In the experiment, subjects were presented with a sequence of decision problems under
risk in a graphical illustration of a two-dimensional budget line on the (x, y)-plane. They
were then asked to select a point, an “allocation,” by clicking on the budget line. The
coordinates of the selected point represent an allocation of points between accounts x
and y. They received the points allocated to one of the accounts, x or y, determined
at random with equal chance. They were presented a total of 25 budgets, which were
selected randomly from the set of budget lines (see Figure 3). The selection of budget
lines was independent across subjects, meaning that the subjects were give different sets
of budget lines.
We note some interpretations of the design that matter for our discussion later. First,
the points that lie on the 45-degree line correspond to equal allocations between the two
8Summary statistics of those key individual characteristics are reported in Table 1 in Choi et al.
(2014).
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Table 1: Sample size for each experiment.
Dataset CKMS CMW CS
Number of subjects 1,182 1,119 1,423
Number of budgets 25 25 25
accounts, and therefore involve no risk. The 45-degree line is the “full insurance” line.
Second, we can interpret the slope of a budget line as a price, in the usual sense: if the
y-intercept is larger than the x-intercept, points in the y account are “cheaper” than
those in the x account.
CMW experiment Carvalho et al. (2016) studied the effect of financial resources on
decision making using two internet panel surveys. In their study 2, they administered a
portfolio choice task and Choi et al. (2014). They fixed the set of 25 budgets, i.e., all
subjects in the survey faced the same set of budgets. A total of 1,119 subjects participated
in this study.
CS experiment Carvalho and Silverman (2017) studied the effects of the complexity
of financial decision making using the University of Southern California’s Understanding
America Study (UAS) panel. A portfolio choice task with 25 budgets was induced in
their baseline survey. A total of 1,423 subjects participated in this study.
4.2 Results
Summary statistics. We exclude five subjects whose e∗ is 0 (i.e., “exact” OEU ra-
tional). We calculate e∗ for the rest of the 3,719 subjects in the three experiments. The
distributions of e∗ are displayed in panel A of Figure 4.
The CKMS sample has a mean e∗ of 1.289, and a median of 1.316. The CMW subjects
have a mean of 1.189 and a median of 1.262, while the CS sample has a mean of 1.143
and a median of 1.128. 9
Recall that the smaller a subject’s e∗ is, the closer her choice data to OEU rationality.
Of course it is hard to exactly interpret the magnitude of e∗, a problem that we turn to
9Since e∗ depends on the design of set(s) of budgets, comparing e∗ across studies requires caution.
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Figure 4: Kernel density estimations of e∗ for all subjects (panel A) and for the subsample
of subjects whose CCEI = 1 (panel B).
in Section 4.3.
Downward sloping demand and e∗ Perturbations in beliefs, prices, or utility, seek
to accommodate a dataset so that it is OEU rationalizable. The accommodation can be
seen as correcting a mismatch of relative prices and marginal rates of substitution: recall
our discussion in the Introduction. Another way to see the accommodation is through
the relation between prices and quantities. Our revealed preference axiom, e-PSAROEU,
bounds certain deviations from downward sloping demand. The minimal e is therefore
a measure of the kinds of deviations from downward sloping demand that are crucial to
OEU rationality.
Figure 5 displays “typical” patterns of choices from subjects with large and small
values of e∗. The figure represents two selected subjects from our data. Panels A and C
plot the observed choices from the different budget lines, and panels B and D plot the
relation between log(x2/x1) and log(p2/p1). The idea in the latter plots is that, if a subject
properly responds to price changes, then as log(p2/p1) becomes higher, log(x2/x1) should
become lower. This relation is also the idea in e-PSAROEU. Therefore, panels B and D
in Figure 5 should have a negative slope for the subjects to be OEU rational.
Observe that both subjects in Figure 5 have CCEI = 1, and are therefore consistent
with utility maximization. The figure illustrates that the nature of OEU violations has
little to do with CCEI.
The subject’s choices in panel C are close to the 45-degree line. At first glance, such
choices might seem to be rationalizable by a very risk-averse expected utility function.
However, as panel D shows, the subject’s choices deviates from downward sloping de-
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Figure 5: Dataset with CCEI = 1 and low e∗ (panels AB) and high e∗ (panels CD).
mand, hence cannot be rationalized by any expected utility function. One might be able
to rationalize the choices made in panel C with certain symmetric models of errors in
choices (like, possibly, “trembling hand” errors), but not with the types of errors captured
by our model.
The observation in Figure 5 generalizes this idea. We calculate Pearson’s correlation
coefficient between log(x2/x1) and log(p2/p1) for each subject in the datasets.
10 Roughly
speaking, the correlation coefficient is negative if subjects exhibit downward sloping de-
mand. The correlation coefficient is close to zero if subjects’ are not responding to price
changes. Figure 6 illustrates the results. The top row of the figure confirms that e∗ and
the correlation between price and quantity, are positively related. This means that as e∗
becomes small, subjects tend to exhibit downward sloping demand. As e∗ becomes large,
subjects become insensitive to price changes. Across all datasets, CKMS, CMW and CS,
e∗ and downward sloping demand are positively related.
We should mention the practice by some authors, notably Friedman et al. (2018),
10Note that log(x2/x1) is not defined at the corners. We thus adjust corner choices by small constant,
0.1% of the budget in each choice, in calculation of the correlation coefficient.
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Panels: (A) CKMS, (B) CMW, (C) CS.
to evaluate compliance with OEU by looking at the correlation between risk-neutral
prices and quantities. Our measure is clearly related to that idea, and the empirical
results presented in this section can be read as a validation of the correlational approach.
Friedman et al. (2018) use their approach to estimate a parametric functional form, using
experimental data in which they vary objective probabilities, not just prices. 11 Our
approach is non-parametric, and focused on testing OEU, not estimating any particular
utility specification.
The bottom row of Figure 6 illustrates the relation between CCEI and the correlation
between price and quantity. The relation is not monotonic. Agents who are closer
to complying with utility maximization do not display a stronger correlation between
prices and quantities. The finding is consistent with our comment about CCEI and OEU
rationality: CCEI measures the distance from utility maximization, which is related to
parallel shifts in budget lines, while e∗ and OEU are about the slope of the budget lines,
and about a negative relation between quantities and prices. Hence, e∗ reflects better
11For the datasets we use, where probabilities are always fixed, the results we report in Figure 5 are
analogous to what Friedman et al. (2018) report in their Figure 6. The regression coefficients in their
Table 2 are proportional to our estimated correlation coefficients (since beliefs are constant).
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Figure 7: Correlation between e∗ and CCEI from (A) CKMS, (B) CMW, and (C) CS.
than CCEI the characterizing properties of OEU.
We should mention that the non-monotonic relation between CCEI and the correlation
coefficient seems to be partially driven by subjects who have CCEI = 1. There are 270
(22.8%) subjects whose CCEI scores equal to 1 in CKMS sample, 210 (18.5%) in CMW
sample, and 315 (22.0%) in CS sample, respectively. Omitting such subjects weakens the
non-monotone relationship. The dotted curves in the bottom row of Figure 6 look at the
relation between CCEI and the correlation coefficient excluding subjects with CCEI = 1.
These curves also have non-monotonic relation, but they (i) exhibit negative relation on
a wider range of the x-axis, and (ii) have wider confidence bands when the correlation
coefficient is positive (fewer observations).
We next turn to a direct comparison of e∗ and CCEI in our data.
Relationship between e∗ and CCEI. Comparing e∗ and CCEI, we find that CCEI
is not a good indication of the distance to OEU rationality. To reiterate a point we
have already made, this should not be surprising as CCEI is meant to test general utility
maximization, and not OEU. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see and quantify the relation
between these measures in the data.
In panel B of Figure 4, we show the distribution of e∗ among subjects whose CCEI
is equal to one, which varies as much as in panel A. Many subjects have CCEI equal to
one, but their e∗’s are far from zero. This means that consistency with general utility
maximization is not necessarily a good indication of consistency with OEU.
That said, the measures are clearly correlated. Figure 7 plots the relation between
CCEI and e∗. As we expect from their definitions (larger CCEI and smaller e∗ correspond
to higher consistency), there is a negative and significant relation between them (Pear-
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son’s correlation coefficient: r = −0.2573, p < 10−15 for CKMS; r = −0.2419, p < 10−15
for CMW; r = −0.3458, p < 10−15 for CS).
Notice that the variability of the CCEI scores widens as the e∗ becomes larger. Ob-
viously, subjects with a small e∗ are close to being consistent with general utility maxi-
mization, and therefore have a CCEI that is close to 1. However, subjects with large e∗
seem to have disperse values of CCEI.
Correlation with demographic variables. We investigate the correlation between
our measure of consistency with expected utility, e∗, and various demographic variables
available in the data. The exercise is analogous to CKMS’s findings using CCEI.
We find that younger subjects, those who have high cognitive abilities, and those who
are working, are closer to being consistent with OEU than older, low ability, or passive,
subjects. For some of the three experiments we also find that highly educated, high-
income subjects, and males, are closer to OEU. Figure 8 summarizes the mean e∗ along
with 95% confidence intervals across several socioeconomic categories. 12 We use the
same categorization as in Choi et al. (2014) to compare our results with their Figure 3.
We observe statistically significant (at a 5% level) gender differences in CMW (two-
sample t-test, t(1114) = −2.2074, p = 0.0275) and CS (two-sample t-test, t(1418) =
−4.4620, p = 8.76 × 10−6), but not in CKMS (two-sample t-test, t(1180) = −0.8703,
p = 0.3843). Male subjects were on average closer to OEU rationality than female
subjects in the CMW and CS samples (panel A).
We find significant age effects as well. Panel B shows that younger subjects are
on average closer to OEU rationality than older subjects (the comparison between age
groups 16-34 and 65+ reveals statistically significant difference in all three datasets; all
two-sample t-tests give p < 10−5).
We observe weak effects of education on e∗ (panel C). 13 Subjects with higher educa-
tion are on average closer to OEU rationality than those with lower education in CKMS
(two-sample t-test, t(829) = 4.1989, p < 10−4), but the difference is not significant in
12Figure D.13 in Appendix D shows correlation between CCEI and demographic variables.
13The low, medium, and high education levels correspond to primary or prevocational secondary
education, pre-university secondary education or senior vocational training, and vocational college or
university education, respectively. It is possible that we observe significant difference depending on how
we categorize education levels, but we used the present categorization for comparability across studies.
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Figure 8: e∗ and demographic variables.
the CMW and CS (t(374) = 1.6787, p = 0.0940 in CMW; t(739) = 1.4113, p = 0.1586 in
CS).
Panel D shows that subjects who were working at the time of the survey are on
average closer to OEU rationality than those who were not (t(1180) = 2.2431, p = 0.0251
in CKMS; t(1114) = 2.4302, p = 0.0153 in CMW; t(1419) = 3.3470, p = 0.0008 in CS).
In panels E1 and E2, we classify subjects according to their Cognitive Reflection Test
score (CRT; Frederick, 2005) or average log reaction times in numerical Stroop task. CRT
consists of three questions, all of which have an intuitive and spontaneous, but incorrect,
answer, and a deliberative and correct answer. Frederick (2005) finds that CRT scores
(number of questions answered correctly) are correlated with other measures of cognitive
ability. In the numerical Stroop task, subjects are presented with a number, such as 888,
and are asked to identify the number of times the digit is repeated (in this example the
answer is 3, while more “intuitive” response is 8). It has been shown that response times
in this task capture the subject’s cognitive control ability.
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The average e∗ for those who correctly answered two questions or more of the CRT
is lower than the average for those who answered at most one question. Subjects with
lower response times in the numerical Stroop task have significantly lower e∗ (two-sample
t-test, t(1114) = −3.345, p = 0.0009).
One of the key findings in Choi et al. (2014) is that consistency with utility maximiza-
tion measured by CCEI was related with household wealth. When we look at the relation
between e∗ and household income, there is a negative trend but the differences across
income brackets are not statistically significant (bracket “0-2.5k” vs. “5k+” two-sample
t-test, t(533) = 1.6540, p = 0.0987; panel F1). Panel F2 presents similar non-significance
between subjects who earned more than 20 thousand USD annually or not in CMW
sample (two-sample t-test, t(1114) = −0.2301, p = 0.8180). When we compare poor
households (annual income less than 20 thousand USD) and wealthy households (annual
income more than 100 thousand USD) from the CS sample, average e∗ is significantly
smaller for the latter sample (two-sample t-test, t(887) = −3.5657, p = 0.0004).
4.3 Minimum Perturbation Test
Our discussion so far has sidestepped one issue. How are we to interpret the absolute
magnitude of e∗? When can we say that e∗ is large enough to reject consistency with
OEU rationality?
To answer this question, we present a statistical test of the hypothesis that an agent
is OEU rational. The test needs some assumptions, but it gives us a threshold level (a
critical value) for e∗. Any value of e∗ that exceeds the threshold indicates inconsistency
with OEU at some statistical significance level.
Our approach follows, roughly, the methodology laid out in Echenique et al. (2011)
and Echenique et al. (2016). First, we adopt the price perturbation interpretation of e in
Section 3.2. The advantage of doing so is that we can use the observed variability in price
to get a handle on the assumptions we need to make on perturbed prices. To this end,
let Dtrue = (p
k, xk)Kk=1 denote a dataset and Dpert = (p˜
k, xk)Kk=1 denote an “perturbed”
dataset. Prices p˜k are prices pk measured with error, or misperceived:
p˜ks = p
k
sε
k
s for all s ∈ S and k ∈ K
where εks > 0 is a random variable.
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If the variance of ε is large, it will be easy to accommodate a dataset as OEU rational.
The larger is the variance of ε, the larger the magnitudes of e that can be rationalized as
consistent with OEU. So, our procedure is sensitive to the assumptions we make about
the variance of ε.
Our approach to get a handle on the variance of ε is to think of an agent who mistakes
true prices p with perturbed prices p˜. If the variance of ε is too large, the agent should
not mistake the distribution of p and p˜. In other words, the distributions of p and p˜
should be similar enough that an agent might plausibly confuse the two. Specifically, we
imagine an agent who conducts a statistical test for the variance of prices. If the true
variance of p is σ20 and the implied variance of p˜ is σ
2
1 > σ
2
0, then the agent would conduct
a test for the null of σ2 = σ20 against the alternative of σ
2 = σ21. We want the variances
to be close enough that the agent might reasonably get inconclusive results from such a
test. Specifically, we assume the sum of type I and type II errors in this test is relatively
large.14
The details of how we design our test are below, but we can advance the main results.
See Figure 9. Each panel corresponds to our results for each of the datasets. The
probability of a type I error is ηI . The probability of a type II error is ηII . Recall that we
focus on situations when ηI +ηII is relatively large, as we want our consumer to plausibly
mistake the distributions of p and p˜. Consider, for example, our results for CKMS. The
outermost numbers assume that ηI + ηII = 0.7. For such numbers, the rejection rates
range from 3% to 41%. For the CS dataset, if we look at the second line of numbers,
where ηI + ηII = 0.65, we see that rejection rates range from 1% to 19%.
Overall, it is fair to say that rejection rates are modest. Smaller values of ηI + ηII
correspond to larger values of Var(ε), and therefore smaller rejection rates. The figure
also illustrates that the conclusions of the test are very sensitive to what one assumes
about Var(ε), through the assumptions about ηI and ηII . But if we look at the largest
rejection rates, for the largest values of ηI + ηII , we get 25% for CS, 27% for CMW, and
41% for CKMS. Many subjects in the CS, CMW and CKMS experiments are inconsistent
with OEU, but at least according to our statistical test, for most subjects the rejections
could be attributed to mistakes.
14The problem of variance is pervasive in statistical implementations of revealed preference tests, see
Varian (1990), Echenique et al. (2011), and Echenique et al. (2016) for example. The use of the sum of
type I and type II errors to calibrate a variance, is new to the present paper.
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Figure 9: Rejection rates under each combination of type I and type II error probabilities
(ηI , ηII ), from CKMS sample (A), CMW sample (B), and CS sample (C).
Rationale behind the test. We now turn to a more detailed exposition of how we
derive our test. Let H0 and H1 denote the null hypothesis that the true dataset Dtrue is
OEU rational and the alternative hypothesis that Dtrue is not OEU rational. To construct
our test, consider a number E∗, which is the result of the following optimization problem.
Given a dataset Dtrue = (p
k, xk)Kk=1:
min
(vks ,λ
k,εks )s,k
max
k∈K,s,t∈S
εks
εkt
s.t. log µ∗s + log v
k
s − log λk − log pks − log εks = 0
xks > x
k′
s′ =⇒ log vks ≤ log vk
′
s′ .
(13)
Under H0, the true dataset Dtrue = (p
k, xk)Kk=1 is OEU rational. A slight modification
of Lemma 7 in Echenique and Saito (2015) then implies that there exist strictly positive
numbers v˜ks , and λ˜
k for s ∈ S and k ∈ K such that
log µ∗s + log v˜
k
s − log λ˜k − log pks = 0 and xks > xk
′
s′ =⇒ log v˜ks ≤ log v˜k
′
ts .
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Substituting the relationship p˜ks = p
k
sε
k
s for all s ∈ S and k ∈ K yields
log µ∗s + log v˜
k
s − log λ˜k − log p˜ks = log εks and xks > xk
′
s′ =⇒ log v˜ks ≤ log v˜k
′
s′ ,
which implies that the tuple (v˜ks , λ˜
k, εks)s,k satisfies the constraint in problem (13).
Letting E∗ ((pk, xk)Kk=1) denote the optimal value of the problem (13), we have
E∗ ((pk, xk)Kk=1) ≤ max
k∈K,s,t∈S
εks
εks
= Ê
under the null hypothesis.
Then, we construct a test as follows:
reject H0 if
∫ ∞
E∗((pk,xk)Kk=1)
fÊ(z)dz < α
accept H0 otherwise
,
where α is the size of the test and fÊ is the density function of the distribution of
Ê = maxk,s,t εks/εkt . Given a nominal size α, we can find a critical value Cα satisfying
Pr[Ê > Cα] = α; we set Cα = F−1Ê (1− α), where FÊ denotes the cumulative distribution
function of Ê . However, because E∗ ((pk, xk)Kk=1) ≤ Ê , the true size of the test is better
than α. Concretely,
size = Pr[E∗ > Cα] ≤ Pr[Ê > Cα] = α.
Parameter tuning. In order to perform the test, we need to obtain the distribution
of Ê and its critical value Cα given a significance level α. We obtain the distribution of
Ê by assuming that ε follows a log-normal distribution ε ∼ Λ(ν, ξ2). 15
The crucial step in our approach is the selection of parameters (ν, ξ2). It is natural to
choose these parameters so that there is no price perturbation on average (i.e., E[ε] = 1).
However, as we discussed above, there is no objective guide to choosing an appropriate
level of Var(ε). Therefore, we use variation in (relative) prices observed in the data.
15Note that parameters (ν, ξ2) correspond to the mean and the variance of the random variable in the
log-scale. In other words, log ε ∼ N(ν, ξ2). The moments of the log-normal distribution ε ∼ Λ(ν, ξ2) are
then calculated by E[ε] = exp(ν + ξ2/2) and Var(ε) = exp(2ν + ξ2)(exp(ξ2)− 1).
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We have assumed that p˜ks = p
k
sε
k
s for all s ∈ S, k ∈ K, and the noise term ε is
independent of the random selection of budgets (pks)k,s. Hence,
Var(p˜) = Var(p) · Var(ε) + Var(p) · E[ε]2 + E[p]2 · Var(ε)
⇐⇒ Var(p˜)
Var(p)
= E[ε]2 +
(
1 +
E[p]2
Var(p)
)
Var(ε).
Given the observed variation in (pks)k,s, Var(ε) determines how much larger (or smaller,
in ratio) the variation of perturbed prices (p˜ks)k,s is relative to actual prices.
Our agent has trouble telling the two variances apart. More generally, the agent
has trouble telling the distributions of prices apart, that is why she is confusing actual
and perceived prices, but the distribution depends only on the variance; so we focus on
variance. Consider a hypothesis test for the null hypothesis that the variance of a normal
random variable with known mean has variance σ20 against the alternative that σ
2 ≥ σ20.
Let σˆ2n be the sample variance.
The agent performs an upper-tailed chi-squared test defined as
H0 : σ
2 = σ20
H1 : σ
2 > σ20
The test statistic is:
Tn =
(n− 1)σˆ2n
σ20
where n is the sample size (i.e., the number of budget sets). The sampling distribution
of the test statistic Tn under the null hypothesis follows a chi-squared distribution with
n− 1 degrees of freedom.
We consider the probability ηI of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true, a type I
error; and the probability ηII of failing to reject the null hypothesis when the alternative
σ2 = σ21 > σ
2
0 is true, a type II error. The test rejects the null hypothesis that the
variance is σ20 if
Tn > χ
2
1−α,n−1
where χ21−α,n−1 is the critical value of a chi-squared distribution with n − 1 degree of
freedom at the significance level α, defined by Pr[χ2 < χ21−α,n−1] = 1− ηI . 16
16An alternative approach, without assuming that a distribution for Tn, and based on a large sample
approximation to the distribution of Tn, yields very similar results. Calculations and empirical findings
are available from the authors upon request.
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Under the alternative hypothesis that σ2 = σ21 > σ
2
0, the statistic (σ
2
0/σ
2
1) · Tn follows
a chi-squared distribution (with n− 1 degrees of freedom). Then, the probability ηII of
making a type II error is given by
ηII = Pr[Tn < χ
2
1−α,n−1 | H1 : σ21 > σ20 is true]
= Pr
[
σ20
σ21
· Tn < σ
2
0
σ21
· χ21−α,n−1
]
= Pr
[
χ2 <
σ20
σ21
· χ21−α,n−1
]
.
Let χ2β,n−1 be the value that satisfies Pr[χ
2 < χ2β,n−1] = η
II . Then, given ηI and ηII ,
we obtain
Pr
[
χ2 <
σ20
σ21
· χ21−α,n−1
]
= ηII ⇐⇒ σ
2
0
σ21
· χ21−α,n−1 = χ2β,n−1 ⇐⇒
σ21
σ20
=
χ21−α,n−1
χ2β,n−1
.
As a consequence, given a measured variance σ20, calculated from observed prices, and
assumed values for ηI and ηII , we can back out the minimum “detectable” value of the
variance σ21. From this variance of prices, we obtain Var(ε).
5 Perturbed Subjective Expected Utility
We now turn to the model of subjective expected utility, in which beliefs are not known.
Instead, beliefs are subjective and unobservable. The analysis will be analogous to what
we did for OEU, and therefore proceed at a faster pace. In particular, all the definitions
and results parallel those of the section on OEU. The proof of the main result (the
axiomatic characterization) is substantially more challenging here because both beliefs
and utilities are unknown: there is a classical problem in disentangling beliefs from utility.
The technique for solving this problem was introduced in Echenique and Saito (2015).
Definition 9. Let e ∈ R+. A dataset (xk, pk)Kk=1 is e-belief-perturbed SEU rational if
there exist µk ∈ ∆++ for each k ∈ K and a concave and strictly increasing function
u : R+ → R such that, for all k,
y ∈ B(pk, pk · xk) =⇒
∑
s∈S
µksu(ys) ≤
∑
s∈S
µksu(x
k
s) (14)
and for each k, l ∈ K and s, t ∈ S
µks/µ
k
t
µls/µ
l
t
≤ 1 + e. (15)
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Note that the definition of e-belief-perturbed SEU rational differs from the defini-
tion of belief-perturbed OEU rationality, only in condition (15); establishing bounds the
perturbations. Here there is no objective probability from which we can evaluate the
deviation of the set {µk} of beliefs. Thus we evaluate perturbations among beliefs, as
in (15).
Remark 1. The constraint on the perturbation applies for each k, l ∈ K and s, t ∈ S, so
it implies for each k, l ∈ K and s, t ∈ S
1
1 + e
≤ µ
k
s/µ
k
t
µls/µ
l
t
≤ 1 + e.
Hence, when e = 0, it must be that µks/µ
k
t = µ
l
s/µ
l
t. This implies that µ
k = µl for a
dataset that is 0-belief perturbed SEU rational.
Next, we propose perturbed SEU rationality with respect to prices.
Definition 10. Let e ∈ R+. A dataset (xk, pk)Kk=1 is e-price-perturbed SEU rational if
there exist µ ∈ ∆++ and a concave and strictly increasing function u : R+ → R and
εk ∈ RS+ for each k ∈ K such that, for all k,
y ∈ B(p˜k, p˜k · xk) =⇒
∑
s∈S
µsu(ys) ≤
∑
s∈S
µsu(x
k
s), (16)
where for each k ∈ K and s ∈ S
p˜ks = p
k
sε
k
s , (17)
and for each k, l ∈ K and s, t ∈ S
εks/ε
k
t
εls/ε
l
t
≤ 1 + e. (18)
Again, the definition differs from the corresponding definition of price-perturbed OEU
rationality only in condition (18), establishing bounds on perturbations. In condition
(18), we measure the size of the perturbations by
εks/ε
k
t
εls/ε
l
t
,
not εks/ε
k
t as in (9). This change is necessary to accommodate the existence of subjective
beliefs. By choosing subjective beliefs appropriately, one can neutralize the perturbation
in prices if εks/ε
k
t = ε
l
s/ε
l
t for all k, l ∈ K. That is, as long as εks/εkt = εls/εlt for all k, l ∈ K,
if we can rationalize the dataset by introducing the noise with some subjective belief µ,
then without using the noise, we can rationalize the dataset with another subjective belief
µ′ such that εksµ
′
s/ε
k
tµ
′
t = µs/µt.
Finally, we define utility-perturbed SEU rationality.
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Definition 11. Let e ∈ R+. A dataset (xk, pk)Kk=1 is e-utility-perturbed SEU rational
if there exist µ ∈ ∆++, a concave and strictly increasing function u : R+ → R, and
εk ∈ RS+ for each k ∈ K such that, for all k,
y ∈ B(pk, pk · xk) =⇒
∑
s∈S
µsε
k
su(ys) ≤
∑
s∈S
µsε
k
su(x
k
s), (19)
and for each k ∈ K and s, t ∈ S
1
1 + e
≤ ε
k
s/ε
k
t
εls/ε
l
t
≤ 1 + e. (20)
As in the previous section, given e, we can show that these three concepts of rationality
are equivalent.
Theorem 3. Let e ∈ R+ and D be a dataset. The following are equivalent:
• D is e-belief-perturbed SEU rational;
• D is e-price-perturbed SEU rational;
• D is e-utility-perturbed SEU rational.
In light of Theorem 3, we shall speak simply of e-perturbed SEU rationality to refer
to any of the above notions of perturbed SEU rationality.
Echenique and Saito (2015) prove that a dataset is SEU rational if and only if it
satisfies a revealed-preference axiom termed the Strong Axiom for Revealed Subjective
Expected Utility (SARSEU). SARSEU states that, for any test sequence (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1, if
each s appears as si (on the left of the pair) the same number of times it appears as s
′
i
(on the right), then
n∏
i=1
pkisi
p
k′i
s′i
≤ 1.
SARSEU is no longer necessary for perturbed SEU-rationality. This is easy to see,
as we allow the decision maker to have a different belief µk for each choice k, and reason
as in our discussion of SAROEU. Analogous to our analysis of OEU, we introduce a
perturbed version of SARSEU to capture perturbed SEU rationality. Let e ∈ R+.
Axiom 2 (e-Perturbed SARSEU (e-PSARSEU)). For any test sequence (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 ≡ σ,
if each s appears as si (on the left of the pair) the same number of times it appears as s
′
i
(on the right), then
n∏
i=1
pkisi
p
k′i
s′i
≤ (1 + e)m(σ).
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We can easily see the necessity of e-PSARSEU by reasoning from the first order
conditions, as in our discussion of e-PSAROEU. The main result of this section shows that
e-PSARSEU is not only necessary for e-perturbed SEU rationality, but also sufficient.
Theorem 4. Let e ∈ R+ and D be a dataset. The following are equivalent:
• D is e-perturbed SEU rational;
• D satisfies e-PSARSEU.
It is easy to see that 0-PSARSEU is equivalent to SARSEU, and that by choosing e
to be arbitrarily large it is possible to rationalize any dataset. As a consequence, we shall
be interested in finding a minimal value of e that rationalizes a dataset: such “minimal e”
is also denoted by e∗.
We should mention, as in the case of OEU, that e∗ depends on the prices which a
decision maker faces. It is clear from e-PSARSEU that 1+e is bounded by the maximum
ratio of prices (i.e., maxk,k′∈K,s,s′∈S pks/p
k′
s′ ).
6 Proofs
6.1 Proof of Theorems 1 and 2
First, we prove a lemma which shows Theorem 1 and is useful for the sufficiency part of
Theorem 2.
Lemma 1. Given e ∈ R+, let (xk, pk)Kk=1 be a dataset. The following statements are
equivalent:
1. (xk, pk)Kk=1 is e-belief-perturbed OEU rational.
2. There are strictly positive numbers vks , λ
k, µks , for s ∈ S and k ∈ K, such that
µksv
k
s = λ
kpks , x
k
s > x
k′
s′ =⇒ vks ≤ vk
′
s′ , (21)
and for all k ∈ K and s, t ∈ S
1
1 + e
≤ µ
k
s/µ
k
t
µ∗s/µ
∗
t
≤ 1 + e. (22)
3. (xk, pk)Kk=1 is e-price-perturbed OEU rational.
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4. There are strictly positive numbers vˆks , λˆ
k, and εks for s ∈ S and k ∈ K, such that
µ∗svˆ
k
s = λˆ
kεksp
k
s , x
k
s > x
k′
s′ =⇒ vˆks ≤ vˆk
′
s′ ,
and for all k ∈ K and s, t ∈ S
1
1 + e
≤ ε
k
s
εkt
≤ 1 + e.
5. (xk, pk)Kk=1 is e-utility-perturbed OEU rational.
6. There are strictly positive numbers vˆks , λˆ
k, and εˆks for s ∈ S and k ∈ K, such that
µ∗sεˆ
k
s vˆ
k
s = λˆ
kpks , x
k
s > x
k′
s′ =⇒ vˆks ≤ vˆk
′
s′ ,
and for all k ∈ K and s, t ∈ S
1
1 + e
≤ εˆ
k
s
εˆkt
≤ 1 + e.
Proof. By the standard way, the equivalence between 1 and 2, the equivalence between 3
and 4, and the equivalence between 5 and 6 hold. Moreover, it is easy to see the equiva-
lence between 4 and 6 with εks = 1/εˆ
k
s for each k ∈ K and s ∈ S. So to show the result,
it suffices to show that 2 and 4 are equivalent.
To show 4 implies 2, define v = vˆ and
µks =
µ∗s
εks
/(∑
s∈S
µ∗s
εks
)
for each k ∈ K and s ∈ S and
λk = λˆk
/(∑
s∈S
µ∗s
εks
)
for each k ∈ K. Then, µk ∈ ∆++(S). Since µ∗svˆks = λˆkεkspks , we have
µksv
k
s = λ
kpks .
Moreover, for each k ∈ K and s, t ∈ S
εks
εkt
=
µks/µ
k
t
µ∗s/µ
∗
t
.
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Hence,
1
1 + e
≤ ε
k
s
εkt
≤ 1 + e.
To show that 2 implies 4, for all s ∈ S define vˆ = v and for all k ∈ K, λˆk = λk. For
all k ∈ K and s ∈ S, define
εks =
µ∗s
µks
.
For each k ∈ K and s ∈ S, since µksuks = λkpks ,
µ∗sv
k
s = λˆ
kεksp
k
s .
Finally, for each k ∈ K and s, t ∈ S,
εks
εkt
=
µ∗s/µ
k
s
µ∗t/µkt
=
µkt /µ
k
s
µ∗t/µ∗s
.
Therefore, we obtain
1
1 + e
≤ ε
k
s
εkt
≤ 1 + e.
6.1.1 Necessity of Theorem 2
Lemma 2. Given e ∈ R+, if a data set is e-belief-perturbed OEU rational, then the data
set satisfies e-PSAROEU.
Proof. Fix any sequence (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 ≡ σ of pairs satisfies conditions (1) and (2). As-
suming differentiability of u and interior solution for simplicity, we have for each k ∈ K
and s ∈ S, µksu′(xks) = λkpks , or
µks
µ∗s
u′(xks) = λ
kρks .
Then,
n∏
i=1
ρkisi
ρ
k′i
s′i
=
n∏
i=1
λk
′
i(µkisi/µ
∗
si
)u′(xkisi )
λki(µ
k′i
s′i
//µ∗s′i)u
′(xk
′
i
s′i
)
=
n∏
i=1
u′(xkisi )
u′(xk
′
i
s′i
)
n∏
i=1
µkisi/µ
∗
si
µ
k′i
s′i
/µ∗s′i
.
The second equality holds by condition (2). By condition (1), the first term is less than
one because of the concavity of u. In the following, we evaluate the second term. First,
for each (k, s) cancel out the same µks as much as possible both from the denominator
and the numerator. Then, the number of µks remained in the numerator is d(σ, k, s).
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Since the number of numerator and the denominator must be the same. The number of
remaining fraction is m(σ) ≡∑s∈S∑k∈K:d(σ,k,s)>0 d(σ, k, s). So by relabeling the index i
to j if necessary, we obtain
n∏
i=1
µkisi/µ
∗
si
µ
k′i
s′i
/µ∗s′i
=
m(σ)∏
j=1
µ
kj
sj /µ
∗
sj
µ
k′j
s′j
/µ∗s′j
.
Consider the corresponding sequence (x
kj
sj , x
k′j
s′j
)
m(σ)
j=1 . Since the sequence is obtained by
canceling out xks from the first element and the second element of the pairs the same
number of times; and since the original sequence (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 satisfies condition (2), it
follows that (x
kj
sj , x
k′j
s′j
)
m(σ)
j=1 satisfies condition (2).
By condition (2), we can assume without loss of generality that kj = k
′
j for each j.
Therefore, by the condition on the perturbation,
m(σ)∏
j=1
µ
kj
sj /µ
∗
sj
µ
k′j
s′j
/µ∗s′j
≤ (1 + e)m(σ).
Hence,
n∏
i=1
ρkisi
ρ
k′i
s′i
≤ (1 + e)m(σ).
6.1.2 Sufficiency of Theorem 2
We need three more lemmas to prove the sufficiency.
Lemma 3. Given e ∈ R+, let a dataset (xk, pk)kk=1 satisfy e-PSAROEU. Suppose that
log(pks) ∈ Q for all k ∈ K and s ∈ S, log(µ∗s) ∈ Q for all s ∈ S, and log(1 + e) ∈ Q.
Then there are numbers vks , λ
k, µks , for s ∈ S and k ∈ K satisfying (21) and (22) in
Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 3 The proof is similar to the case in which e = 0. By log-linearizing
conditions (21) and (22) in Lemma 1, we have for all s ∈ S and k ∈ K, such that
log µks + log v
k
s = log λ
k + log pks , (23)
xks > x
k′
s′ =⇒ log vks ≤ log vk
′
s′ , (24)
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and for all k ∈ K and s, t ∈ S
− log(1 + e) + log µ∗s − log µ∗t ≤ log µks − log µkt ≤ log(1 + e) + log µ∗s − log µ∗t . (25)
Matrix A looks as follows:

··· vks vkt vls vlt ··· ··· µks µkt µls µlt ··· ··· λk λl ··· p
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
(k,s) · · · 1 0 0 0 · · · · · · 1 0 0 0 · · · · · · −1 0 · · · − log pks
(k,t) · · · 0 1 0 0 · · · · · · 0 1 0 0 · · · · · · −1 0 · · · − log pks
(l,s) · · · 0 0 1 0 · · · · · · 0 0 1 0 · · · · · · 0 −1 · · · − log pls
(l,t) · · · 0 0 0 1 · · · · · · 0 0 0 1 · · · · · · 0 −1 · · · − log pls
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...

.
Matrix B has additional rows as follows in addition to the rows in Echenique and Saito
(2015):

··· vks vkt vls vlt ··· ··· µks µkt µls µlt ··· ··· λk λl ··· p
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
· · · 0 0 0 0 · · · · · · −1 1 0 0 · · · · · · 0 0 · · · log(1 + e)− log µ∗s + log µ∗t
· · · 0 0 0 0 · · · · · · 1 −1 0 0 · · · · · · 0 0 · · · log(1 + e) + log µ∗s − log µ∗t
· · · 0 0 0 0 · · · · · · 0 0 1 −1 · · · · · · 0 0 · · · log(1 + e) + log µ∗s − log µ∗t
· · · 0 0 0 0 · · · · · · 0 0 −1 1 · · · · · · 0 0 · · · log(1 + e)− log µ∗s + log µ∗t
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...

.
Matrix E is the same as in Echenique and Saito (2015).
The entries of A, B, and E are either 0, 1 or −1, with the exception of the last column
of A. Under the hypotheses of the lemma we are proving, the last column consists of
rational numbers. By Motzkin’s theorem, then, there is such a solution u to S1 if and
only if there is no rational vector (θ, η, pi) that solves the system of equations and linear
inequalities
S2 :

θ · A+ η ·B + pi · E = 0,
η ≥ 0,
pi > 0.
Claim There exists a sequence (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)n
∗
i=1 ≡ σ of pairs that satisfies conditions (1)
and (2) in e-PSAROEU.
Proof. Denote the weight on the rows capturing log µks−log µkt ≤ log(1+e)+log µ∗s−log µ∗t
by θ(k, s, t). Then, notice that the corresponding constraint − log(1+e)+log µ∗s−log µ∗t ≤
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log µks − log µkt is denoted by θ(k, t, s). So for each k ∈ K and s ∈ S,
n(xks)− n′(xks) +
∑
t6=s
[
− θ(k, s, t) + θ(k, t, s)
]
= 0
Hence ∑
s∈S
[
n(xks)− n′(xks)
]
=
∑
s∈S
∑
t6=s
[
θ(k, s, t)− θ(k, t, s)
]
= 0
Claim
∏n∗
i=1
ρ
ki
si
ρ
k′
i
s′
i
> (1 + e)m(σ
∗).
Proof. By the fact that the last column must sum up to zero and E has one at the last
column, we have
n∗∑
i=1
log
p
k′i
s′i
pkisi
+ log(1 + e)
∑
k∈K
∑
s∈S
∑
t6=s
θ(k, s, t) +
∑
k∈K
∑
s∈S
∑
t6=s
(θ(k, s, t)− θ(k, t, s)) log µ∗s = −pi < 0.
Remember that for all k ∈ K and s ∈ S,
n(xks)− n′(xks) =
∑
t6=s
[
θ(k, s, t)− θ(k, t, s)
]
.
So for each s ∈ S
∑
k∈K
∑
s∈S
∑
t6=s
[
θ(k, s, t)− θ(k, t, s)
]
log µ∗s =
n∗∑
i=1
log
µ∗si
µ∗s′i
.
Hence,
0 > −pi
=
n∗∑
i=1
log
p
k′i
s′i
pkisi
−
n∗∑
i=1
log
µ∗si
µ∗s′i
+ log(1 + e)
∑
k∈K
∑
s∈S
∑
t6=s
θ(k, s, t)
=
n∗∑
i=1
log
ρ
k′i
s′i
ρkisi
+ log(1 + e)
∑
k∈K
∑
s∈S
∑
t6=s
θ(k, s, t).
Since d(σ∗, k, s) = n(xks)−n′(xks) =
∑
t6=s
[
θ(k, s, t)− θ(k, t, s)
]
≤
∑
t6=s
θ(k, s, t), we have
m(σ∗) ≡
∑
s∈S
∑
k∈K:d(σ∗,k,s)>0
d(σ∗, k, s) =
∑
s∈S
∑
k∈K
min{n(xks)− n′(xks), 0} ≤
∑
s∈S
∑
k∈K
∑
t6=s
θ(k, s, t).
37
Therefore
0 >
n∗∑
i=1
log
ρ
k′i
s′i
ρkisi
+ log(1 + e)
∑
k∈K
∑
s∈S
∑
t6=s
θ(k, s, t) ≥
n∗∑
i=1
log
ρ
k′i
s′i
ρkisi
+ log(1 + e)m(σ∗).
That is,
n∗∑
i=1
log
ρkisi
ρ
k′i
s′i
> m(σ∗) log(1 + e). This is a contradiction.
Lemma 4. Given e ∈ R+, let a dataset (xk, pk)kk=1 satisfy e-PSAROEU with respect to
µ∗. Then for all positive numbers ε, there exist a positive real numbers e′ ∈ [e, e + ε],
µ′s ∈ [µ∗s − ε, µ∗s + ε], and qks ∈ [pks − ε, pks ] for all s ∈ S and k ∈ K such that log qks ∈ Q
for all s ∈ S and k ∈ K, log(µ′s) ∈ Q for all s ∈ S, and log(1 + e′) ∈ Q, µ′ ∈ ∆++(S),
and the dataset (xk, qk)kk=1 satisfy e
′-PSAROEU with respect to µ′.
Proof of Lemma 4 Consider the set of sequences that satisfy Conditions (1) and (2) in
PSAROEU(e):
Σ =
{
(xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 ⊂ X 2
∣∣∣∣∣ (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 satisfies conditions (1) and (2)
in e-PSAROEU for some n
}
.
For each sequence σ ∈ Σ, we define a vector tσ ∈ NK2S2 as in Lemma 9.
Define δ as in Lemma 9. Then, δ is a K2S2-dimensional real-valued vector. If σ =
(xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1, then
δ · tσ =
∑
((k,s),(k′,s′))∈(KS)2
δ((k, s), (k′, s′))tσ((k, s), (k′, s′)) = log
 n∏
i=1
ρkisi
ρ
k′i
s′i
 .
So the dataset satisfies e-PSAROEU with respect to µ if and only if δ ·tσ ≤ m(σ) log(1+e)
for all σ ∈ Σ.
Enumerate the elements in X in increasing order: y1 < y2 < · · · < yN . And fix an
arbitrary ξ ∈ (0, 1). We shall construct by induction a sequence {(εks(n))}Nn=1, where
εks(n) is defined for all (k, s) with x
k
s = yn.
By the denseness of the rational numbers, and the continuity of the exponential
function, for each (k, s) such that xks = y1, there exists a positive number ε
k
s(1) such that
log(ρksε
k
s(1)) ∈ Q and ξ < εks(1) < 1. Let ε(1) = min{εks(1) | xks = y1}.
In second place, for each (k, s) such that xks = y2, there exists a positive ε
k
s(2) such
that log(ρksε
k
s(2)) ∈ Q and ξ < εks(2) < ε(1). Let ε(2) = min{εks(2) | xks = y2}.
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In third place, and reasoning by induction, suppose that ε(n) has been defined and
that ξ < ε(n). For each (k, s) such that xks = yn+1, let ε
k
s(n + 1) > 0 be such that
log(ρksε
k
s(n+1)) ∈ Q, and ξ < εks(n+1) < ε(n). Let ε(n+1) = min{εks(n+1) | xks = yn}.
This defines the sequence (εks(n)) by induction. Note that ε
k
s(n + 1)/ε(n) < 1 for all
n. Let ξ¯ < 1 be such that εks(n+ 1)/ε(n) < ξ¯.
For each k ∈ K and s ∈ S, let ρˆks = ρksεks(n), where n is such that xks = yn. Choose
µ′ ∈ ∆++(S) such that for all s ∈ S log µ′s ∈ Q and µ′s ∈ [ξ¯µs, µs/ξ¯] for all s ∈ S. Such µ′
exists by the denseness of the rational numbers. Now for each k ∈ K and s ∈ S, define
qks =
ρˆks
µ′s
. (26)
Then, log qks = log ρˆ
k
s − log µ′s ∈ Q.
We claim that the dataset (xk, qk)Kk=1 satisfies e
′-PSAROEU with respect to µ′. Let
δ∗ be defined from (qk)Kk=1 in the same manner as δ was defined from (ρ
k)Kk=1.
For each pair ((k, s), (k′, s′)) with xks > x
k′
s′ , if n and m are such that x
k
s = yn and
xk
′
s′ = ym, then n > m. By definition of ε,
εks(n)
εk
′
s′ (m)
<
εks(n)
ε(m)
< ξ¯ < 1.
Hence,
δ∗((k, s), (k′, s′)) = log
ρksε
k
s(n)
ρk
′
s′ ε
k′
s′ (m)
< log
ρks
ρk
′
s′
+ log ξ¯ < log
ρks
ρk
′
s′
= δ((k, s), (k′, s′)).
Now, we choose e′ such that e′ ≥ e and log(1 + e′) ∈ Q.
Thus, for all σ ∈ Σ, δ∗ · tσ ≤ δ · tσ ≤ m(σ) log(1 + e) ≤ m(σ) log(1 + e′) as t· ≥ 0 and
the dataset (xk, pk)Kk=1 satisfies e-PSAROEU with respect to µ.
Thus the dataset (xk, qk)Kk=1 satisfies e
′-PSAROEU with respect to µ′. Finally, note
that ξ < εks(n) < 1 for all n and each k ∈ K, s ∈ S. So that by choosing ξ close enough
to 1, we can take ρˆ to be as close to ρ as desired. By the definition, we also can take µ′
to be as close to µ as desired. Consequently, by (26), we can take (qk) to be as close to
(pk) as desired. We also can take e′ to be as close to e as desired. 
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Lemma 5. Given e ∈ R+, let a dataset (xk, pk)kk=1 satisfy e-PSAROEU with respect to
µ. Then there are numbers vks , λ
k, µks , for s ∈ S and k ∈ K satisfying (21) and (22) in
Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 5 Consider the system comprised by (23), (24), and (25) in the
proof of Lemma 3. Let A, B, and E be constructed from the dataset as in the proof of
Lemma 3. The difference with respect to Lemma 3 is that now the entries of A4 may not
be rational. Note that the entries of E, B, and Ai, i = 1, 2, 3 are rational.
Suppose, towards a contradiction, that there is no solution to the system comprised
by (23), (24), and (25). Then, by the argument in the proof of Lemma 3 there is no
solution to System S1. Lemma 1 with F = R implies that there is a real vector (θ, η, pi)
such that θ · A+ η · B + pi · E = 0 and η ≥ 0, pi > 0. Recall that B4 = 0 and E4 = 1, so
we obtain that θ · A4 + pi = 0.
Consider (qk)Kk=1, µ
′, and e′ be such that the dataset (xk, qk)Kk=1 satisfies e
′-PSAROEU
with respect to µ′, and log qks ∈ Q for all k and s, log µ′s for all s ∈ S, and log(1+e′) ∈ Q.
(Such (qk)Kk=1, µ
′, and e′ exists by Lemma 4.) Construct matrices A′, B′, and E ′ from
this dataset in the same way as A, B, and E is constructed in the proof of Lemma 3.
Note that only the prices, the objective probabilities, and the bounds are different. So
E ′ = E, B′ = B and A′i = Ai for i = 1, 2, 3. Only A
′
4 may be different from A4.
By Lemma 4, we can choose qk, µ′, and e′ such that |θ ·A′4 − θ ·A4| < pi/2. We have
shown that θ · A4 = −pi, so the choice of qk, µ′, and e′ guarantees that θ · A′4 < 0. Let
pi′ = −θ · A′4 > 0.
Note that θ · A′i + η · B′i + pi′Ei = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3, as (θ, η, pi) solves system S2 for
matrices A, B and E, and A′i = Ai, B
′
i = Bi and Ei = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3. Finally, B4 = 0
so θ ·A′4 + η ·B′4 + pi′E4 = θ ·A′4 + pi′ = 0. We also have that η ≥ 0 and pi′ > 0. Therefore
θ, η, and pi′ constitute a solution to S2 for matrices A′, B′, and E ′.
Lemma 1 then implies that there is no solution to S1 for matrices A′, B′, and E ′.
So there is no solution to the system comprised by (23), (24), and (25) in the proof
of Lemma 3. However, this contradicts Lemma 3 because the dataset (xk, qk) satisfies
e′-PSAROEU with µ′, log(1 + e) ∈ Q, log µ′s ∈ Q for all s ∈ S, and log qks ∈ Q for all
k ∈ K and s ∈ S. 
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6.2 Proof of Theorems 3 and 4
First, we prove a lemma which proves Theorem 3 and is useful for the sufficiency part of
Theorem 4.
Lemma 6. Given e ∈ R+, let (xk, pk)Kk=1 be a dataset. The following statements are
equivalent:
1. (xk, pk)Kk=1 is e-belief-perturbed SEU rational.
2. There are strictly positive numbers vks , λ
k, µks , for s ∈ S and k ∈ K, such that
µksv
k
s = λ
kpks , x
k
s > x
k′
s′ =⇒ vks ≤ vk
′
s′ , (27)
and for each k, l ∈ K and s, t ∈ S
µks/µ
k
t
µls/µ
l
t
≤ 1 + e. (28)
3. (xk, pk)Kk=1 is e-price-perturbed SEU rational.
4. There are strictly positive numbers vˆks , λˆ
k, µs, and ε
k
s for s ∈ S and k ∈ K, such
that
µsvˆ
k
s = λˆ
kεksp
k
s , x
k
s > x
k′
s′ =⇒ vˆks ≤ vˆk
′
s′ ,
and for all k, l ∈ K and s, t ∈ S
εks/ε
k
t
εls/ε
l
t
≤ 1 + e.
5. (xk, pk)Kk=1 is e-utility-perturbed SEU rational.
6. There are strictly positive numbers vˆks , λˆ
k, µs, and εˆ
k
s for s ∈ S and k ∈ K, such
that
µsεˆ
k
s vˆ
k
s = λˆ
kpks , x
k
s > x
k′
s′ =⇒ vˆks ≤ vˆk
′
s′ ,
and for all k, l ∈ K and s, t ∈ S
εˆks/εˆ
k
t
εˆls/εˆ
l
t
≤ 1 + e.
Proof. By the standard way, the equivalence between 1 and 2, the equivalence between 3
and 4, and the equivalence between 5 and 6 hold. Moreover, it is easy to see the equiva-
lence between 4 and 6 with εks = 1/εˆ
k
s for each k ∈ K and s ∈ S. So to show the result,
it suffices to show that 2 and 4 are equivalent.
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To show 4 implies 2, define v = vˆ and
µks =
µs
εks
/(∑
s∈S
µs
εks
)
for each k ∈ K and s ∈ S and
λk = λˆk
/(∑
s∈S
µs
εks
)
for each k ∈ K. Then, µk ∈ ∆++(S). Since µsvˆks = λˆkεkspks , we have
µksv
k
s = λ
kpks .
Moreover, for each k, l ∈ K and s, t ∈ S
µks/µ
k
t
µls/µ
l
t
=
εkt /ε
k
s
εlt/ε
l
s
≤ 1 + e.
To show 2 implies 4, for all s ∈ S define vˆ = v and
µs =
∑
k∈K
µks
|K| .
Then, µ ∈ ∆++(S). For all k ∈ K, λˆk = λk. For all k ∈ K and s ∈ S, define
εks =
µs
µks
.
For each k ∈ K and s ∈ S, since µksvks = λkpks ,
µsv
k
s = λˆ
kεksp
k
s .
Finally, for each k, l ∈ K and s, t ∈ S,
εks/ε
k
t
εls/ε
l
t
=
µkt /µ
k
s
µlt/µ
l
s
≤ 1 + e.
6.2.1 Necessity of Theorem 4
Lemma 7. Given e ∈ R+, if a data set is e-belief-perturbed SEU rational then the data
set satisfies e-PSARSEU.
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Proof. Fix any sequence (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 ≡ σ of pairs satisfies conditions (1)–(3). Assuming
differentiability of u and interior solution for simplicity, we have for each k ∈ K and
s ∈ S
µksu
′(xks) = λ
kpks .
Then,
n∏
i=1
pkisi
p
k′i
s′i
=
n∏
i=1
λk
′
iµkisiu
′(xkisi )
λkiµ
k′i
s′i
u′(xk
′
i
s′i
)
=
n∏
i=1
u′(xkisi )
u′(xk
′
i
s′i
)
n∏
i=1
µkisi
µ
k′i
s′i
.
The second equality holds by condition (3). By condition (1), the first term is less than
one because of the concavity of u. In the following, we evaluate the second term. First,
for each (k, s) cancel out the same µks as much as possible both from the denominator
and the numerator. Then, the number of µks remained in the numerator is d(σ, k, s).
Since the number of numerator and the denominator must be the same, the number of
remaining fraction is m(σ) ≡∑s∈S∑k∈K:d(σ,k,s)>0 d(σ, k, s). So by relabeling the index i
to j if necessary, we obtain
n∏
i=1
µkisi
µ
k′i
s′i
=
m(σ)∏
j=1
µ
kj
sj
µ
k′j
s′j
.
Consider the corresponding sequence (x
kj
sj , x
k′j
s′j
)
m(σ)
j=1 . Since the sequence is obtained by
canceling out xks from the first element and the second element of the pairs the same
number of times; and since the original sequence (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 satisfies condition (2) and
(3), it follows that (x
kj
sj , x
k′j
s′j
)
m(σ)
j=1 satisfies condition (2) and (3).
By condition (2), we can assume without loss of generality that sj = s
′
j for each j.
Fix s∗ ∈ S. Then by the robustness condition, for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m(σ)},
µ
kj
sj
µ
k′j
s′j
=
µ
kj
sj
µ
k′j
sj
≤ (1 + e)µ
k′j
s∗
µ
kj
s∗
.
Moreover by condition (3),
m(σ)∏
j=1
µ
k′j
s∗
µ
kj
s∗
= 1.
Therefore,
m(σ)∏
j=1
µ
kj
si
µ
k′j
s′j
≤ (1 + e)m(σ)
n∏
j=1
µ
k′j
s∗
µ
kj
s∗
= (1 + e)m(σ),
and hence,
n∏
i=1
pkisi
p
k′i
s′i
≤ (1 + e)m(σ).
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Remark 2. We need to show the lemma because in the proof of sufficiency we weaken
the dual of the rationality condition.
6.2.2 Sufficiency of Theorem 4
We need three more lemmas to prove the theorem.
Lemma 8. Given e ∈ R+, let a dataset (xk, pk)kk=1 satisfy e-PSARSEU. Suppose that
log(pks) ∈ Q for all k and s and log(1 + e) ∈ Q. Then there are numbers vks , λk, µks , for
s ∈ S and k ∈ K satisfying (27) and (28) in Lemma 6.
Proof of Lemma 8 The proof is similar to the case in which e = 0. By log-linearizing
conditions (27) and (28) in Lemma 6, we have for all s ∈ S and k ∈ K, such that
log µks + log v
k
s = log λ
k + log pks , (29)
xks > x
k′
s′ =⇒ log vks ≤ log vk
′
s′ , (30)
and for all k, l ∈ K and s, t ∈ S
log µks − log µkt − log µls + log µlt ≤ log(1 + e). (31)
Matrix A looks as follows:

··· vks vkt vls vlt ··· ··· µks µkt µls µlt ··· ··· λk λl ··· p
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
(k,s) · · · 1 0 0 0 · · · · · · 1 0 0 0 · · · · · · −1 0 · · · − log pks
(k,t) · · · 0 1 0 0 · · · · · · 0 1 0 0 · · · · · · −1 0 · · · − log pks
(l,s) · · · 0 0 1 0 · · · · · · 0 0 1 0 · · · · · · 0 −1 · · · − log pls
(l,t) · · · 0 0 0 1 · · · · · · 0 0 0 1 · · · · · · 0 −1 · · · − log pls
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...

.
Matrix B has additional rows as follows in addition to the rows in Echenique and Saito
(2015).

··· vks vkt vls vlt ··· ··· µks µkt µls µlt ··· ··· λk λl ··· p
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
· · · 0 0 0 0 · · · · · · −1 1 1 −1 · · · · · · 0 0 · · · log(1 + e)
· · · 0 0 0 0 · · · · · · 1 −1 −1 1 · · · · · · 0 0 · · · log(1 + e)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
 .
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Matrix E is the same as in Echenique and Saito (2015).
The entries of A, B, and E are either 0, 1 or −1, with the exception of the last column
of A. Under the hypotheses of the lemma we are proving, the last column consists of
rational numbers. By Motzkin’s theorem, then, there is such a solution u to S1 if and
only if there is no rational vector (θ, η, pi) that solves the system of equations and linear
inequalities
S2 :

θ · A+ η ·B + pi · E = 0,
η ≥ 0,
pi > 0.
Claim There exists a sequence (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)n
∗
i=1 of pairs that satisfies conditions (1) and (3)
in e-PSARSEU.
Proof. The same as the case in which e = 0. From matrix B, we obtain a chain z >
· · · > z′. Define xk1s1 = z and x
k′1
s′1
= z′. By (30), we have −1 in the column of vk1s1 and 1 in
the column v
k′1
s′1
. So these −1 and 1 are canceled out in A1. By repeating this, we obtain
a sequence (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)n
∗
i=1 of pairs that satisfies Condition (1).
Claim The sequence (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)n
∗
i=1 ≡ σ∗ satisfies condition (2) in e-PSARSEU.
Proof. Denote the weight on the rows capturing
µks/µ
k
t
µls/µ
l
t
≤ 1 + e by θ(k, l, s, t). Note that
µlt/µ
l
s
µkt /µ
k
s
=
µks/µ
k
t
µls/µ
l
t
, so we only have the constraint
µks/µ
k
t
µls/µ
l
t
≤ 1 + e but not µlt/µls
µkt /µ
k
s
≤ 1 + e;
hence we will not have θ(l, k, t, s). On the other hand, we need to have the constraint
µls/µ
l
t
µks/µ
k
t
≤ 1 + e which is equivalent to µks/µkt
µls/µ
l
t
≥ 1/(1 + e). This constraint corresponds to
θ(l, k, s, t).
Let n(xks) ≡ #{i | xks = xkisi} and n′(xks) ≡ #{i | xks = x
k′i
s′i
}.
For each k ∈ K and s ∈ S, in the column corresponding to µks , remember that we
have 1 if we have xks = x
ki
si
for some i and −1 if we have xks = xk
′
i
s′i
for some i. This
is because a row in A must have 1 (−1) in the column vks if and only if it has 1 (−1,
respectively) in the column µks . So in the column in matrix A, we have n(x
k
s)− n′(xks).
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Now we consider matrix B. In the column of µks , we have −1 in the row multiplied by
θ(k, l, s, t) and 1 in the row multiplied by θ(l, k, s, t). So we also have−∑l 6=k∑t6=s θ(k, l, s, t)+∑
l 6=k
∑
t6=s θ(l, k, s, t).
For each k ∈ K and s ∈ S, the column corresponding to µks of matrices A and B
must sum up to zero; so we have
n(xks)− n′(xks)−
∑
l 6=k
∑
t6=s
θ(k, l, s, t) +
∑
l 6=k
∑
t6=s
θ(l, k, s, t) = 0.
Therefore, for each s,∑
k∈K
(
n(xks)− n′(xks)
)
=
∑
k∈K
[∑
l 6=k
∑
t6=s
θ(k, l, s, t)−
∑
l 6=k
∑
t6=s
θ(l, k, s, t)
]
= 0.
Claim
∏n∗
i=1
p
ki
si
p
k′
i
s′
i
> (1 + e)m(σ
∗).
Proof. By the fact that the last column must sum up to zero and E has one at the last
column, we have
n∗∑
i=1
log
p
k′i
s′i
pkisi
+
(∑
k∈K
∑
l 6=k
∑
s∈S
∑
t6=s
θ(k, l, s, t)
)
log(1 + e) = −pi < 0.
Hence, by multiplying −1, we have
n∗∑
i=1
log
pkisi
p
k′i
s′i
−
(∑
k∈K
∑
l 6=k
∑
s∈S
∑
t6=s
θ(k, l, s, t)
)
log(1 + e) > 0.
Remember that for all k ∈ K and s ∈ S,
n(xks)− n′(xks) = +
∑
l 6=k
∑
t6=s
θ(k, l, s, t)−
∑
l 6=k
∑
t6=s
θ(l, k, s, t) ≤
∑
l 6=k
∑
t6=s
θ(k, l, s, t).
Since d(σ∗, k, s) = n(xks)− n′(xks), we have
m(σ∗) ≡
∑
s∈S
∑
k∈K:d(σ∗,k,s)>0
d(σ∗, k, s)
=
∑
s∈S
∑
k∈K
max{n(xks)− n′(xks), 0}
≤
∑
s∈S
∑
k∈K
∑
l 6=k
∑
t6=s
θ(k, l, s, t).
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Therefore
n∗∑
i=1
log
pkisi
p
k′i
s′i
>
(∑
k∈K
∑
l 6=k
∑
s∈S
∑
t6=s
θ(k, l, s, t)
)
log(1 + e)
≥ m(σ∗) log(1 + e).
This is a contradiction.
Let X = {xks | k ∈ K, s ∈ S}.
Lemma 9. Given e ∈ R+, let a dataset (xk, pk)kk=1 satisfy e-PSARSEU. Then for all
positive numbers ε, there exist a positive real number e′ ∈ [e, e+ε] and qks ∈ [pks−ε, pks ] for
all s ∈ S and k ∈ K such that log qks ∈ Q and the dataset (xk, qk)kk=1 satisfy e′-PSARSEU.
Proof of Lemma 9 Consider the set of sequences that satisfy Conditions (1), (2), and
(3) in e-PSARSEU:
Σ =
{
(xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 ⊂ X 2
∣∣∣∣∣ (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 satisfies conditions (1), (2), and (3)
in e-PSARSEU for some n
}
.
For each sequence σ ∈ Σ, we define a vector tσ ∈ NK2S2 . For each pair (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
), we shall
identify the pair with ((ki, si), (k
′
i, s
′
i)). Let tσ((k, s), (k
′, s′)) be the number of times that
the pair (xks , x
k′
s′ ) appears in the sequence σ. One can then describe the satisfaction of
e-PSARSEU by means of the vectors tσ. Observe that t depends only on (x
k)Kk=1 in the
dataset (xk, pk)Kk=1. It does not depend on prices.
For each ((k, s), (k′, s′)) such that xks > x
k′
s′ , define δ((k, s), (k
′, s′)) = log(pks/p
k′
s′ ). And
define δ((k, s), (k′, s′)) = 0 when xks ≤ xk′s′ . Then, δ is a K2S2-dimensional real-valued
vector. If σ = (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1, then
δ · tσ =
∑
((k,s),(k′,s′))∈(KS)2
δ((k, s), (k′, s′))tσ((k, s), (k′, s′)) = log
 n∏
i=1
pkisi
p
k′i
s′i
 .
So the dataset satisfies e-PSARSEU if and only if δ ·tσ ≤ m(σ) log(1+e) for all σ ∈ Σ.
Enumerate the elements in X in increasing order: y1 < y2 < · · · < yN . And fix an
arbitrary ξ ∈ (0, 1). We shall construct by induction a sequence {(εks(n))}Nn=1, where
εks(n) is defined for all (k, s) with x
k
s = yn.
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By the denseness of the rational numbers, and the continuity of the exponential
function, for each (k, s) such that xks = y1, there exists a positive number ε
k
s(1) such that
log(pksε
k
s(1)) ∈ Q and ξ < εks(1) < 1. Let ε(1) = min{εks(1) | xks = y1}.
In second place, for each (k, s) such that xks = y2, there exists a positive ε
k
s(2) such
that log(pksε
k
s(2)) ∈ Q and ξ < εks(2) < ε(1). Let ε(2) = min{εks(2) | xks = y2}.
In third place, and reasoning by induction, suppose that ε(n) has been defined and
that ξ < ε(n). For each (k, s) such that xks = yn+1, let ε
k
s(n + 1) > 0 be such that
log(pksε
k
s(n+1)) ∈ Q, and ξ < εks(n+1) < ε(n). Let ε(n+1) = min{εks(n+1) | xks = yn}.
This defines the sequence (εks(n)) by induction. Note that ε
k
s(n + 1)/ε(n) < 1 for all
n. Let ξ¯ < 1 be such that εks(n+ 1)/ε(n) < ξ¯.
For each k ∈ K and s ∈ S, let qks = pksεks(n), where n is such that xks = yn. We claim
that the dataset (xk, qk)Kk=1 satisfies e-PSARSEU. Let δ
∗ be defined from (qk)Kk=1 in the
same manner as δ was defined from (pk)Kk=1.
For each pair ((k, s), (k′, s′)) with xks > x
k′
s′ , if n and m are such that x
k
s = yn and
xk
′
s′ = ym, then n > m. By definition of ε,
εks(n)
εk
′
s′ (m)
<
εks(n)
ε(m)
< ξ¯ < 1.
Hence,
δ∗((k, s), (k′, s′)) = log
pksε
k
s(n)
pk
′
s′ ε
k′
s′ (m)
< log
pks
pk
′
s′
+ log ξ¯ < log
pks
pk
′
s′
= δ((k, s), (k′, s′)).
Now we choose e′ such that e′ ≥ e and log(1 + e′) ∈ Q.
Thus, for all σ ∈ Σ, δ∗ · tσ ≤ δ · tσ ≤ m(σ) log(1 + e) ≤ m(σ) log(1 + e′) as t· ≥ 0 and
the dataset (xk, pk)Kk=1 satisfies e-PSARSEU.
Thus the dataset (xk, qk)Kk=1 satisfies e
′-PSARSEU. Finally, note that ξ < εks(n) < 1
for all n and each k ∈ K, s ∈ S. So that by choosing ξ close enough to 1 we can take (qk)
to be as close to (pk) as desired. We also can take e′ to be as close to e as desired. 
Lemma 10. Given e ∈ R+, let a dataset (xk, pk)kk=1 satisfy e-PSARSEU. Then there are
numbers vks , λ
k, µks , for s ∈ S and k ∈ K satisfying (27) and (28) in Lemma 6.
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Proof of Lemma 10 Consider the system comprised by (29), (30), and (31) in the
proof of Lemma 8. Let A, B, and E be constructed from the dataset as in the proof of
Lemma 8. The difference with respect to Lemma 8 is that now the entries of A4 may not
be rational. Note that the entries of E, B, and Ai, i = 1, 2, 3 are rational.
Suppose, towards a contradiction, that there is no solution to the system comprised
by (29), (30), and (31). Then, by the argument in the proof of Lemma 8 there is no
solution to System S1. Lemma 1 with F = R implies that there is a real vector (θ, η, pi)
such that θ · A+ η · B + pi · E = 0 and η ≥ 0, pi > 0. Recall that B4 = 0 and E4 = 1, so
we obtain that θ · A4 + pi = 0.
Let (qk)Kk=1 vectors of prices and a positive real number e
′ be such that the dataset
(xk, qk)Kk=1 satisfies e
′-PSARSEU and log qks ∈ Q for all k and s and log(1 + e′) ∈ Q.
(Such (qk)Kk=1 and e
′ exists by Lemma 9.) Construct matrices A′, B′, and E ′ from this
dataset in the same way as A, B, and E is constructed in the proof of Lemma 8. Since
only prices qk and the bound e′ are different in this dataset, only A′4 may be different
from A4. So E
′ = E, B′ = B and A′i = Ai for i = 1, 2, 3.
By Lemma 9, we can choose prices qk such that |θ · A′4 − θ · A4| < pi/2. We have
shown that θ · A4 = −pi, so the choice of prices qk guarantees that θ · A′4 < 0. Let
pi′ = −θ · A′4 > 0.
Note that θ · A′i + η · B′i + pi′Ei = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3, as (θ, η, pi) solves system S2 for
matrices A, B and E, and A′i = Ai, B
′
i = Bi and Ei = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3. Finally, B4 = 0
so θ ·A′4 + η ·B′4 + pi′E4 = θ ·A′4 + pi′ = 0. We also have that η ≥ 0 and pi′ > 0. Therefore
θ, η, and pi′ constitute a solution to S2 for matrices A′, B′, and E ′.
Lemma 1 then implies that there is no solution to S1 for matrices A′, B′, and E ′.
So there is no solution to the system comprised by (29), (30), and (31) in the proof
of Lemma 8. However, this contradicts Lemma 8 because the dataset (xk, qk) satisfies
e′-PSARSEU, log(1 + e) ∈ Q, and log qks ∈ Q for all k ∈ K and s ∈ S. 
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